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LOOKS SELL, BUT ARE THEY WORTH THE 
COST?: HOW TOLERATING LOOKS-BASED 
DISCRIMINATION LEADS TO INTOLERABLE 
DISCRIMINATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Abercrombie & Fitch (A&F) is a clothing retailer that markets its 
wares primarily to young adults.1 A&F expects its sales staff—termed 
“brand representatives”—to represent the company with “natural, classic 
American style.”2 Toward that end, like other employers staffing public 
contact positions,3 A&F holds its employees to strict grooming standards 
for controllable aspects of their physical appearance.4 A&F articulates 
these standards in its “Look Policy.”5  
That Look Policy lies at the heart of Gonzalez v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, Inc.,6 a class action lawsuit that culminated in late 2004 in an 
 1. Abercrombie & Fitch is an Ohio-based retail chain that operates over 600 stores throughout 
the United States. In 2003, it reported annual sales of $1.6 billion. Kristin Young, A&F Denies 
Discrimination, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, June 19, 2003, at 9; Monica Yant Kinney, At Abercrombie 
‘The Look’ Matters, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 7, 2003, at B1 (describing A&F’s “target customers” as 
teenagers and college students). 
 2. Steven Greenhouse, Going for the Look, but Risking Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 
2003, at 12 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Going for the Look] (quoting A&F’s communication’s director, 
Tom Lennox). ABERCROMBIE & FITCH ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK, p. 28 (Revised Jul. 2003) [hereinafter 
ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK]. Additional expectations include: “look great while exhibiting individuality”; 
“project energy and enthusiasm—make the store a warm, inviting place that provides an exciting and 
energetic social experience for the customer”; “greet and assist customers”; “maintain the store 
presentation.” Id. 
 3. See infra note 62 (discussing brand image and discrimination charges at Polo Ralph Lauren). 
 4. Reasonable grooming standards, or employer regulations of employees’ dress and other 
controllable aspects of employees’ physical appearance, are permissible unless they discriminate by 
having a disparate impact on a protected class. See Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th 
Cir. 1975) (upholding employer railroad’s restriction on male employees’ hair length because the 
grooming policy was reasonable and applied evenhandedly, compliance was easily within employees’ 
control, and the lack of a similar requirement for females had “only a negligible effect on employment 
opportunities”). 
 5. Answer of Defendant at ¶ 4, Gonzalez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
26, 2004) (No. C03-2817 SI) [hereinafter Defendant’s Answer]. The “look policy” restricts hair to a 
“clean, natural, classic” style, makeup to a “fresh, natural” appearance, nails to a “clear or natural” 
color, and jewelry to a “simple and classic” style. ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK, supra note 2. It forbids 
facial hair but allows tattoos that “represent the Abercrombie look” as defined by a store manager. Id. 
 6. Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Gonzalez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 
(N.D. Cal. June 10, 2004) (No. 03-2817 SI) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Complaint]. The suit was filed in 
June 2003 in federal district court in California and settled in November 2004. See Steven Greenhouse, 
Abercrombie & Fitch Bias Case is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A16 [hereinafter 
Greenhouse, Settled]. Two additional suits based on the same facts were included in the settlement: 
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approximately $50 million settlement7 between A&F and fourteen named 
plaintiffs8 who suggested the policy does more than permissibly regulate 
employees’ appearance on the job.9 The complaint charged A&F with race 
discrimination,10 alleging that its Look Policy excludes individuals from 
sales floor positions when their natural physical features do not represent 
the A&F conception11 of “natural, classic American style.”12 The plaintiffs 
contended that A&F conceives “classic American style” as “virtually all-
white.”13 A&F denied the allegations both before14 and after the 
settlement,15 insisting that it “prides itself on diversity” and has “zero 
tolerance for discrimination . . . on the basis of race” or any legally 
protected characteristic.16 It also, however, admittedly prides itself on its 
West v. Abercrombie & Fitch, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2004) (No. 04-4730), a gender discrimination suit, 
and Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2004) (No. 
04-4731), a federal suit based on A&F’s alleged violation of Title VII. Consent Decree, Gonzalez v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (N.D. Cal. April 11, 2005) (No. 03-2817 SI), at 6–7 [hereinafter 
Consent Decree]. 
 7. The settlement includes a $40 million restitution fund and an additional $7.25 million for 
plaintiffs’ legal fees, as well as various provisions designed to ensure that A&F actively cultivates a 
racially diverse workforce. Consent Decree, at 58; Julie Tamaki, Judge Accepts Abercrombie Plan to 
Settle Hiring Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at C2. 
 8. Plaintiffs represented multiple minority groups including African Americans, Latinos, and 
Asian Americans. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 1. Some plaintiffs were former A&F 
employees alleging that they were terminated, constructively discharged after A&F “zeroed [them] 
out” by refusing to assign them any shifts despite their availability to work, or demoted from sales 
floor to stockroom positions. Id. ¶¶ 58, 62, 67, 70, 76, 81, 89–91, Other plaintiffs were applicants who 
were denied positions at A&F stores despite their prior retail experience. Id. ¶¶ 43, 48, 51, 54, 95–6, 
100, 105. 
 9. The complaint alleged that A&F’s Look Policy for employee grooming is but one aspect of a 
systematic effort to promote “the ‘A&F Look.’” See, e.g., id. ¶ 7. This effort involves carefully 
cultivating the appearance of the A&F workforce, beginning with initial selection of applicants who 
“fit” the look and continuing through corporate “blitzes” where A&F managers visit various stores in 
order to assess the stores’ success at implementing the A&F image through employees’ appearance. Id. 
¶¶ 7, 8. The complaint alleged that A&F collects photographs of a sampling of employees from all of 
its stores, selects those that provide “exemplary models” of individuals who “fit the ‘Look,’” and 
distributes these examples to all stores for guidance in their efforts to achieve the look through 
employee appearance. Id. ¶ 9. 
 10. Id. ¶ 1.  
 11. Id. ¶¶ 4,6.  
 12. ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK, supra note 2. 
 13. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 4. 
 14. Defendant’s Answer, supra note 5. 
 15. Greenhouse, Settled, supra note 6, at A16 (quoting A&F chairperson’s statement that A&F 
has “and has always had no tolerance for discrimination” and that it settled to avoid the costs of 
protracted litigation). 
 16. Young, supra note 1, at 9 (quoting A&F statement in response to Gonzalez suit). In addition, 
the Look Policy portion of the A&F Associate Handbook includes the following diversity statement: 
“Abercrombie associates represent American style. America is diverse, and we want diversity in our 
stores. We do not discriminate, and will not tolerate discrimination in hiring based on gender, age, 
race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, marital status, veteran status, citizenship, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/11
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good-looking sales force;17 one of its affirmative defenses to the Gonzalez 
suit was business necessity.18 Plaintiffs believe the settlement will change 
the face of A&F by requiring it to increase minority recruitment efforts for 
brand representative positions and to feature racial diversity in its 
marketing tools.19 
The race discrimination claim set forth in the Gonzalez complaint was 
not novel,20 yet the complaint and subsequent settlement sparked a flurry 
of media interest in A&F’s looks-based employment policies and 
practices.21 According to their own executives, A&F “brand 
representatives” are not just predominantly “blond” and “blue-eyed” but 
also “preppy,” “pretty,” and “handsome.”22 Such descriptions beg the 
question of whether A&F executives, its customers, and the law should 
accept the additional exclusions, beyond race, implied by A&F’s careful 
efforts to cultivate such a good-looking sales force. The Gonzalez 
complaint itself subtly suggests that “the A&F Look” potentially affects, 
not only racial minorities, but anyone who does not “fit within the narrow 
confines” of a look defined by more than skin color.23 These individuals 
ancestry, or disability.” ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK, supra note 2. 
 17. A&F admits to closely regulating its employees’ dress and style. When an interviewer asked 
A&F CEO Mike Jeffries whether A&F’s focus on clothes that flatter a narrow range of figures unduly 
excluded some persons, he reportedly replied, “If I exclude people, absolutely, [I’m] delighted to do 
so.” Jim Edwards, Whitewash? Abercrombie & Fitch Says It Isn’t Racist. Do Its Marketing and Hiring 
Tell a Different Story?, ADWEEK, Oct. 6, 2003, at 14. 
 18. Defendant’s Answer, supra note 5, ¶ 154. The answer does not elaborate on the rationale for 
its business necessity defense. Presumably it would rest on the need to perpetuate the A&F image 
described supra note 2. 
 19. Tamaki, supra note 7, at C2. Minimizing the significance of the marketing materials aspect 
of the settlement, an A&F spokesman reportedly stated that A&F’s marketing materials were diverse 
even before the settlement. Id. 
 20. Interview by Tavis Smiley with Kimberly West-Faulcon, National Public Radio (Dec. 9, 
2003). West-Faulcon, one of the Gonzalez plaintiffs’ attorneys, characterized the Gonzalez suit as a 
“simple” race discrimination claim not invoking issues of looks-based discrimination or a company’s 
right to market to target audiences. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12. A&F’s efforts to promote its 
image through its hiring practices were also the subject of a segment on CBS’s 60 Minutes news 
program, which aired first on December 7, 2003. 
 22. Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12. 
 23. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 6. Before the settlement, A&F primarily drew 
employees from a narrow field of college students (Defendant’s Answer, supra note 5, ¶ 10), allegedly 
focusing its efforts on specified fraternities, sororities, and athletic teams. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, supra 
note 6, ¶ 10. The settlement precludes A&F from concentrating its recruitment efforts at 
predominantly white fraternities and sororities. Consent Decree, supra note 6, p. 29. A&F managers 
also reportedly recruit employees from their customer pool, offering positions to select shoppers who 
have “the look.” See Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12 (reporting that 5’6’’ 
“striking” blond shopper was offered a job while shopping at A&F); Kinney, supra note 1, at B02 
(reporting that a “petite” blond 18-year old was offered a job while shopping at A&F). The complaint 
alleged that when prospective sales associates inquire about available positions, managers sometimes 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1295 Fleener book pages.doc4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1295 
 
 
 
 
 
 
could include overweight people, short people, homely people, and others 
who are not categorically protected from employment discrimination 
under existing law.24 
Looks-based employment discrimination is permitted in most 
jurisdictions.25 It represents a long-important marketing strategy that is 
becoming even more prevalent in efforts to market products to fickle 
audiences26 and is likely a natural psychological process.27 Nonetheless, 
many are uneasy about the dominant role looks28 play in an employment 
context where looks—much like race, sex, or age—are irrelevant to most 
core job duties.29 Moreover, the story told in the Gonzalez complaint 
suggests that hiring sales associates by looks in order to market a “classic 
American” product may motivate racial employment discrimination, 
which is legally prohibited and condemned by society.30 In doing so, this 
falsely tell those who “do not fit the ‘A&F Look’” that the store is not hiring. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, 
supra note 6, ¶ 5. Alternatively, managers may provide the individual with an application but later 
throw the completed application away without review after the applicant leaves the store. Id. 
 24. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination 
on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2040–42 (1987) [hereinafter Note, 
Facial Discrimination] (describing the lack of a legal remedy for unattractive, short, and overweight 
individuals who experience employment discrimination, in contrast to the protection afforded on the 
bases of sex, race, and disability).  
 25. Physical attractiveness is not a protected characteristic in the employment discrimination 
laws of most jurisdictions. See Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit 
Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 209–11 (2000). Michigan 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of height and weight. Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (2001). The District of Columbia prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
“personal appearance.” D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.11 (2001). Similar prohibitions exist by city 
ordinance in Santa Cruz, California; Urbana, Illinois; and Madison, Wisconsin. See Adamitis, supra 
(discussing statutes prohibiting looks-based discrimination); Lynn T. Vo, Note, A More Attractive 
Look at Physical Appearance-Based Discrimination: Filling the Gap in Appearance-Based Anti-
Discrimination Law, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 352 (2002) (listing state and local statutes and ordinances). 
 26. A good-looking workforce can be an important asset in the competitive retail industry. See 
Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12. Greenhouse quotes an industry analyst who 
describes the importance of “walking billboard[s]”—in the form of attractive salespeople with whom 
shoppers want to associate—in keeping the attention of a young market. Id. 
 27. See Karen Dion, Ellen Berscheid, & E. Walster, What Is Beautiful Is Good, 24 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 285 (1972). 
 28. Greenhouse quotes an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission attorney’s statement that 
“[t]he problem with all this image stuff is it just reeks of marketing for this white-bread, Northern 
European, thin, wealthy, fashion-model look,” and “[w]e all can’t be Anglo, athletic, and young.” 
Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12. Cf. Richard Roeper, Some Say It’s Pretty Ugly: 
Real Life Is Full of “Lookism,” CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at 11 (responding to a 60 Minutes 
segment on A&F’s Look Policy by arguing that lookism is so pervasive in American society that no 
one should be surprised that physical attractiveness is a dominant hiring criterion for retailers). Some 
A&F employees’ reported treatment of applicants who do not fit the look suggests that even they have 
at least some misgivings about the role of looks as a hiring criterion. See infra Part V. 
 29. See supra note 2 for a discussion of job duties of described in A&F handbook, which include 
greeting customers and maintaining store displays. 
 30. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/11
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story adds a new dimension to old questions of the appropriate role of 
“lookism”31 in American society and whether physical traits perceived as 
unattractive should be recognized as a protected class in antidiscrimination 
law.32 
This Note will critique the asymmetry in the law presented by the 
existence of protected classes, such as race and sex, which are defined in 
part by their physical characteristics, without corresponding protection for 
individuals who endure employment discrimination based on looks, which 
similarly bears no relation to one’s ability to perform job duties.33 Part II 
explores the goals and justifications of antidiscrimination law. It also 
discusses the link between looks-based discrimination and discrimination 
against protected classes, and summarizes previously asserted analogies 
between them. Part III will explain why looks-based discrimination 
historically has not been prohibited. It will argue that looks-based 
discrimination should be prohibited in principle but that previously 
asserted analogy-based rationales alone are insufficient to justify such a 
prohibition. Finally, Part IV will endorse the view that existing 
antidiscrimination law can be adapted to prohibit looks-based 
discrimination. It will propose that, to provide a complete justification for 
such a modification in the law, proponents of a prohibition on looks-based 
discrimination should focus their arguments on the heightened risk that 
“lookist” polices create for discrimination against decidedly protected 
classes. 
 31. Lookism refers to the idea that a person’s appearance indicates his or her value, measured 
according to “society’s construction” of a standard of beauty. M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro-
Meyer, Many Paths to Justice: The Glass Ceiling, The Looking Glass, and Strategies for Getting to the 
Other Side, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 61, 87 (2003). 
 32. One author reported that one third of people interviewed felt that workers who are 
“unattractive, overweight or generally look or dress unconventionally should be given special 
government legal protection.” Maureen Milford, If You Don’t Fit the Company Image—Watch Out, 
NEWS JOURNAL, June 20, 2005, at 1F (writing on discrimination claims arising from a casino’s 
requirement that its “Borgata Babes” maintain their weight, a rule enforced by weigh-ins). See also 
Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2035 (proposing that disability law protection could 
encompass individuals discriminated against on the basis of unattractive looks). 
 33. See, e.g., Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2044–45 (asserting that legal 
protection for a job applicant with a disfiguring facial scar without corresponding protection for an 
applicant with a jutting chin “seems an arbitrary distinction”). 
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II. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF THE TREATMENT OF PHYSICAL 
APPEARANCE IN AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
A. General Goals and Limits of Antidiscrimination Law in the 
Employment Context 
Scholars have applied a variety of theoretical approaches to explain 
American antidiscrimination law and its close connection to broad legal 
themes of justice and equality.34 The traditionally understood goal of 
antidiscrimination law in the United States is fairness through the 
neutralization of “widespread forms of prejudice that pervasively 
disadvantage persons based upon inaccurate judgments about their worth 
or capacities.”35 Antidiscrimination laws represent a legislative judgment 
that certain attributes are unjustified bases for excluding individuals from 
social goods, including employment opportunities.36 Protected attributes 
tend to be those that are understood as “essential or integral to a person.”37 
Race38 is perhaps the most firmly socially and legislatively recognized39 
 34. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 17, 57 (1996). 
Koppelman surveys process-based and result-based approaches to antidiscrimination law, including 
multiple theories under each approach. Id. In general, process-based rationales focus on the 
inappropriateness of the protected characteristic as a basis for decision-making and the state’s duty to 
be impartial. Id. at 55, 59. Result-based rationales focus on the harmful, unjustified stigmatization of 
various groups. Id. at 64. Koppelman asserts that these theories make the same “ethical claim”: a 
characteristic is protected when society rejects the idea that people “deserve less concern and respect” 
because they display that characteristic. Id. at 98. 
 35. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000). Antidiscrimination law accomplishes its goal by singling out certain 
“stigmatizing characteristic[s]” for protection from discrimination. Id. at 9. Post continues, “American 
antidiscrimination law understands itself as negating such prejudice by eliminating or carefully 
scrutinizing the use of stigmatizing characteristics as a ground for judgment.” Id.  
 36. See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 568 (1998). The Supreme Court has explained that racial classifications are 
highly suspect because they usually represent the troubling “view that those in the burdened class are 
not as worthy or deserving as others.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985). Gender classifications are also suspect because of their likely basis in inaccurate, “outmoded 
notions of the relative capabilities” of the sexes. Id. at 441. 
 37. Post, supra note 35, at 9. This implies that, while immutability is sufficient to bring an 
attribute within the protection of antidiscrimination law, it is not necessary. Such a view is relevant to 
the issue of protection for looks, which are increasingly mutable with the new prevalence of cosmetic 
surgery. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 38. Paul Brest describes the “antidiscrimination principle,” which strongly disfavors 
classifications, judgments, and practices that depend on a person’s race. Paul Brest, In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976). Rationales for the antidiscrimination 
principle include: preventing “irrational and unfair infliction of injury” inherent in judgments that “rest 
on assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups” or on “racially selective sympathy and 
indifference,” and preventing harms such as stigmatization and the denial of opportunities to acquire 
various benefits. Id. at 6–8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/11
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example of a protection-worthy attribute, because of its history as an 
irrational basis for decision-making that has led to unfair results and 
stigmatization of groups of people.40 The antidiscrimination principle 
conceivably allows for the expansion of legal protection to cover any 
disadvantaged trait.41 In practice, however, the law does not, and perhaps 
cannot, neutralize every widespread prejudice.42 Complete neutrality may 
not even be desirable.43  
In an effort to understand how and why different attributes are selected 
for different levels of legal protection from discrimination,44 some scholars 
interpret antidiscrimination law as a mechanism of social transformation.45 
For example, Robert Post’s sociological theory views antidiscrimination 
law not as a codification of aspirations directed toward achieving an 
optimally rational and fair world, but as “a social practice, which regulates 
other social practices” that are influenced by the culturally-determined 
 39. Congress considers race discrimination to be perhaps the most invidious kind of 
discrimination. This distinction is the most frequently offered rationale for the absence of a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to race discrimination. See Michael J. Frank, Justifiable 
Discrimination in the News and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color 
BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 496 (2001). Congress considered but declined to adopt a BFOQ 
defense for race-based selection criteria because it found race discrimination to be “more prevalent and 
harmful” than other forms of discrimination. Id. 
 40. See supra note 34 for a discussion of both process- and result-based rationales. 
 41. Brest, supra note 38, at 11. Usually, the harm from discrimination must be particularly 
serious and unbalanced by its social utility before antidiscrimination law intervenes to offset the 
disadvantage. Id. Koppelman argues that this test is overprotective, given the massive cultural 
transformation that must occur for antidiscrimination laws to accomplish their goals. KOPPELMAN, 
supra note 34, at 115. 
 42. Practical problems prevent attempts to neutralize every widespread prejudice; for example, 
enforcing rules prohibiting discrimination on subtle characteristics could involve intensive state 
involvement in private affairs. Post, supra note 35, at 8. In addition, the high cost of prevention and 
enforcement often prohibits the expansion of antidiscrimination laws. Roderick M. Hills Jr., You Say 
You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination 
Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1608 (1997). 
 43. Post, supra note 35, at 4 (suggesting that complete equality could product a “nightmare 
dystopia”). Post asserts that attempting to equalize every difference among people would amount to a 
dehumanizing reductio ad absurdum of American antidiscrimination law and that the prohibition of 
looks-based discrimination is in this realm of the absurd. Id. at 8. Similarly, Koppelman questions 
whether eradicating the stigmatization of ugliness would also entail eradicating appreciation of beauty, 
which has great social value. KOPPELMAN, supra note 34, at 64. 
 44. On the issue of whether antidiscrimination law should protect any particular group, 
Koppelman proposes this question: “does the prevailing understanding of that group unjustifiably 
stigmatize or socially construct its members in a way that reduces the group’s political power, material 
wealth, and autonomy?” KOPPELMAN, supra note 34, at 116. 
 45. Post, supra note 35, at 36. See also KOPPELMAN, supra note 34, at 8 (explaining the 
“antidiscrimination project” as a massive social effort to “reconstruct social reality to eliminate or 
marginalize the shared meanings, practices, and institutions that unjustifiably single out certain groups 
of citizens for stigma and disadvantage”). 
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significant differences among people.46 Unlike traditional 
antidiscrimination theory, the sociological perspective explains that, 
because some differences carry connotations too socially useful to be 
disallowed as a basis for decision-making,47 the law does not attempt to 
make life fair for everyone.48 It also envisions antidiscrimination law as 
capable of effecting lasting change, not just in the way people treat each 
other in order to comply with the law, but in the way they perceive each 
other.49 
Current antidiscrimination law protects individuals on the basis of 
race,50 sex,51 age,52 and disabilities such as disfigurements53—visually 
identifiable groups for which society has misconceptions about ability to 
perform job duties.54 Use of these characteristics as a criterion for 
employment decisions perpetuates the unjustified stigmatization of many 
individuals.55 Moreover, because these qualities rarely relate to actual 
ability to perform job duties, these characteristics are usually an irrational 
 46. Post, supra note 35, at 17. This is in contrast to “the dominant conception,” which views 
antidiscrimination law as stripping away irrational decision-making criteria in order to ensure that 
decisions are based on individual merit. Id. 
 47. “[T]he ambitions of the law vary depending upon the social practice at issue.” Post, supra 
note 35, at 36. For example, “antidiscrimination law seeks to exercise a far more sweeping 
transformation of race than of gender.” Id. at 37. See also supra note 39. 
 48. Post describes the law as “a practical, ramshackle institution, full of compromise and 
contradiction.” Post, supra note 35, at 16. While it aspires to fairness and equal opportunity, its actual 
operation is one of a mere social practice regulating other social practices. Id. at 17. 
 49. See id. at 17. This stands in contrast to the traditional view, which envisions the law as 
preventing people from acting on “the discriminatory impulse,” rather than changing the impulse itself. 
Rubin, supra note 36, at 573. 
 Another alternative view of antidiscrimination law is the institutional theory, which posits that 
antidiscrimination law is primarily concerned with the proper allocation of the responsibility for 
achieving society’s utopian ideals. Under this view, antidiscrimination law represents an 
acknowledgement that some private institutions are better able than others to “promote full, fair, and 
democratic deliberation on certain sensitive and divisive controversies.” Hills, supra note 42, at 1620. 
Its “core concern . . . is not to resolve disputes about whether some characteristic is worthy of respect; 
rather, antidiscrimination law merely bars certain suspect methods of conducting the debate.” Thus, a 
prohibition on employment discrimination against a certain class can be understood as expressing “a 
judgment about jurisdiction—a judgment that a particular private institution is not a proper forum in 
which to resolve controversies about the propriety of stigma.” Id. 
 50. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2000). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). 
 53. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). 
 54. See generally Adamitis, supra note 25. Other bases for protection, including religion and 
national origin, are outside the scope of this Note. 
 55. Koppelman asserts that stigma entails a “withholding of respect” that taints decision-making 
processes, including hiring decisions, and leads to unfair results for stigmatized individuals. 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 34, at 9. 
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basis for decision-making.56 Under current law, even customer or 
coworker preference for, or animus against, these characteristics is 
insufficient to make them a rational basis for employment-related 
decision-making.57 Individuals who have qualifications for the core job 
duties but lack the necessary looks—a physically apparent but less clearly 
categorized facet of appearance—suffer similar injuries when employers 
refuse to hire them because they do not fit the image the company seeks to 
project.58 Nonetheless, current law allows employers to use looks as an 
employee selection criterion in most jurisdictions,59 despite the sense that 
lookism is unfair and, consequently, should be prohibited under the 
traditionally understood purposes of antidiscrimination law.60  
B. The Relationship between Permitted Looks-Based Discrimination and 
Impermissible Discrimination against Protected Categories 
1. Looks & Protected Categories Generally: The Attractiveness Bias 
as Motivator of Illegal Discrimination 
Employment discrimination issues embody a fundamental tension 
between employers’ freedom to market an image and employees’ rights to 
 56. Id. 
 57. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the history and purpose 
of the general refusal to recognize customer preference as a justification for discrimination, see Gina 
Browne, Target Hiring to Reach a Target Audience, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 125, 136–39 (2002). 
 58. It is important to distinguish salesperson positions from model positions. Salesperson 
positions typically require employees to wear the company’s product or a look-a-like at work but also 
involve duties of handling sales transactions, tracking inventory, maintaining store displays, and 
assisting customers. See Occupational Information Network Online, Summary Report for: 41-2031.00 
Retail Salespersons, http:/online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/41-2031.00 (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
In contrast, model job duties are typically limited to representing the product on a national or 
international basis by displaying the product on the employee’s body. See Occupational Information 
Network Online, Summary Report for: 41-9012.00 Models, http:/online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/ 
41-9012.00 (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). For modeling positions, looks are clearly related to the core 
duties of the position. Salesperson positions, the primary duties of which can be performed 
successfully regardless of the employee’s looks, are the entrypoint for this Note’s examination of the 
legitimacy of looks-based discrimination. Although A&F calls its salespersons “Brand 
Representatives,” their core job duties are typical of other retail positions. See supra note 2. 
Furthermore, a company cannot escape the mandates of antidiscrimination law simply by claiming 
that, according to its business strategy, a core duty of a sales position is to serve as a walking billboard. 
See supra note 26 and infra note 80. 
 59. See Adamitis, supra note 25, at 199. Adamitis notes that “[r]ecourse for appearance 
discrimination is limited,” unless the affected individual sues in a jurisdiction that prohibits 
appearance-based discrimination or finds a way to frame the claim within a protected category. Id.; see 
also supra note 25. 
 60. See supra notes 34–35, 38, 46. 
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equality and autonomy.61 In the retail industry, A&F has not been the only 
employer to face charges of impermissible discrimination in connection 
with its permissible use of looks-based employee selection criteria.62 
Moreover, permissible looks-based discrimination has occurred alongside 
or has underlain charges of illegal discrimination against protected classes 
in a variety of industries,63 for a lengthy span of time.64 Employers across 
industries share the business strategy of hiring employees whose “look” 
furthers the company’s marketing campaign or reinforces its image.65 
Looks-based discrimination also can be part of an effort to hire individuals 
with whom customers would like to interact.66 Thus, an employee’s “look” 
 61. Post, supra note 35, at 5. 
 62. Abercrombie & Fitch’s Look Policy is just one example of retailers’ common strategy of 
hiring attractive individuals for salesperson positions, and strictly regulating their appearance on the 
job thereafter, in order to market the company image. Polo Ralph Lauren stores, which offer items 
inspired by a “country club” lifestyle, reportedly utilize strict dress and grooming standards to 
incorporate employees into its efforts to market that image. See Teri Agins, Color Line: A Fashion 
House with an Elite Aura Wrestles with Race, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2002, at A1. In 1999, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission investigated Polo employees’ complaints of race 
discrimination, based on allegations similar to those in the complaint against A&F—minority 
salespersons claimed they consistently were assigned to the stockroom instead of the sales floor. Id.  
 63. The casino industry is one of the most recent to come under legal fire for allegedly 
discriminatory appearance policies. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 
2004); Suzette Parmley, At Borgota, It’s Fit the Mold—Or Else, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 31, 2005. For 
other industries where appearance policies were challenged under anti-discrimination laws, see Craft 
v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (television newscasting industry); Wilson v. 
Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (airline industry); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal 
USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (cosmetics industry); Guardian Capital Corp. v. 
N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Kenneth L. Schneyer, 
Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse about Sex Discrimination, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551 
(1998) (restaurant industry); and Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12 (hotel industry). 
 64. Cases challenging airlines’ appearance standards for flight attendants were brought as early 
as 1968. See discussion of Dodd v. American Airlines, infra note 98. In addition, looks-based 
discrimination is likely widespread today. One journalist reported that 16% of workers interviewed 
claimed to be victims of looks-based discrimination—most commonly because of their weight or their 
hairstyle. Maureen Milford, If You Don’t Fit In—Watch Out, NEWS. J., June 20, 2005 available at 
http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.d11/article?AID=2005506200301. 
 65. For a report on the increasing emphasis on “hiring by looks” for marketing purposes in 
“upscale businesses,” see Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12. Hiring by looks 
exposes companies to the potential for discrimination litigation, because courts find illegal 
discrimination even if appearance policies have an “unintended impact on employee demographics.” 
Edwards, supra note 17, at 14 (emphasis added).  
 66. See Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12 (quoting a retail industry analyst 
who stated that “a guy wants to go hang out in a store where he can see good-looking gals”). See also 
ELAINE HATFIELD & SUSAN SPRECHER, MIRROR, MIRROR: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOOKS IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE 55 (1986) (noting that hiring by looks “may be especially pervasive” for public 
contact positions because employers correctly expect the public to respond more favorably to attractive 
people); Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 
1174, 1174 (1994) (suggesting that job applicants are aware that physical attractiveness is one of the 
relevant, potentially valuable “attributes” they bring to the labor market). 
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is likely to be most crucial, and looks-based discrimination most likely to 
occur, for public contact positions.67 In light of the gravity of the harm to 
victims of illegal discrimination, courts generally refuse to recognize 
either customer preference or company image68—the most common 
reasons for looks-based employment policies —as justifications for 
discrimination against members of protected categories.69 Physical 
appearance is unprotected in most jurisdictions,70 however, and hiring 
people who will both reinforce the company’s image and appeal to its 
customers makes good business sense.71 When such practices include 
discrimination against a protected class, however, courts strike them 
down.72 Furthermore, given the range of situations in which looks-based 
selection criteria co-occur with instances of discrimination against a 
protected class,73 facially legal looks-based policies are often laden with 
illegal implications.74 Because various aspects of physical appearance are 
 67. Cf. Hamermesh & Biddle, supra note 66, at 1191. Hamermesh and Biddle found that the 
“productivity” associated with beauty varies by occupation and may be heightened in some 
occupations because of customer preferences, presumably as to the type of person with whom they 
want to interact. They note, however, that “there are earnings premia and penalties for looks 
independent of occupation.” Id. See also Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 31, at n.166 (citing 
a British study from 2000 finding that unattractive women faced an earnings penalty, when compared 
to attractive women, in clerical and craft occupations but, contrary to expectations, attractive women in 
customer-service jobs experienced an earnings penalty). 
 68. Harvard economics professor Robert Barro asserts that “the only meaningful measure of 
productivity is the amount a worker adds to customer satisfaction and to the happiness of coworkers.” 
Robert J. Barro, So You Want to Hire the Beautiful. Well, Why Not?, BUS. WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 18. 
He likens the high value placed on physical appearance in certain industries to the high value placed 
on intelligence in others and argues that eliminating looks as a valid employment selection criterion 
would “effectively throw away national product” by diverting the resource of looks from its most 
productive use. Id. 
 69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (2005). Preferences of the employer, other employees, clients, 
or customers are not a basis for a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), except for positions 
such as an actor or actress, where “authenticity or genuineness” requires hiring an individual of a 
certain sex. Id. and 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2005). But see Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 1979 WL 
290, *4 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that customer preference was a BFOQ in a rare situation where 
hiring a female “regardless of her qualifications would have totally subverted any business” the 
employer might conduct in a cultural setting that strongly disfavored female businesspersons). 
 70. See supra note 25. 
 71. See Greenhouse, Going for the Look, supra note 2, at 12. Rationalizing looks-based 
discrimination as a business strategy to appeal to public preference still involves prejudicial lookism, 
just on the part of customers, encouraged by the employer-company. Id. 
 72. See Adamitis, supra note 25, at 217 (noting that looks-related claims can succeed under Title 
VII or the ADEA if the plaintiff can allege that the “real reason or impact of the employment action” 
involved a protected category). 
 73. See supra note 63 (listing industries in which looks-based discrimination has co-occurred 
with discrimination against protected categories). 
 74. See E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 70–90, 1969 WL 2903, *1 (1969) (discussing an African American 
woman’s rejection as an applicant for a flight attendant position because the interviewer deemed her 
“large” lips unattractive). 
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identifying characteristics of many protected categories,75 permissible 
policies of looks-based discrimination often result in illegal 
discrimination. 
2. Looks and Sex 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits sex 
discrimination in employment.76 Discrimination on the basis of sex is 
excused only where an employer can establish that sex is a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) that “relate[s] to ability to perform” job 
duties “that fall within the ‘essence’ of the particular business.”77 A BFOQ 
is an “extremely narrow” defense to sex discrimination.78 Unless sexual 
services or entertainment is the primary service the employer provides,79 
the mere desire to hire sexually appealing members of one sex for the 
purpose of drawing and pleasing customers is insufficient to establish a 
BFOQ defense to sex discrimination.80  
 75. Physical attributes like skin color, build, and the size and shape of facial features signal a 
person’s “ancestry,” as they developed in response to the demands of various world climates. NANCY 
ETCOFF, SURVIVAL OF THE PRETTIEST: THE SCIENCE OF BEAUTY 134–35 (2000). Differences in facial 
features, such as jaw and brow size and shape, distance between the eyes, and nose protrusion, also 
help people distinguish between the sexes. Id. at 152. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2004). 
 77. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204, 206 (1991). The Court held that the employer could not establish a 
BFOQ for sex to justify its policy prohibiting female employees from working in areas of high lead 
exposure, which posed a risk to female fertility. Id. at 206. The Court also stated that the employer’s 
concern that placing women in high lead exposure areas would increase its risk of exposure to 
expensive lawsuits did not justify the prohibition, as “the extra cost of employing members of one sex 
. . . does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of 
that gender.” Id. at 210. 
 78. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
 79. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (asserting that a 
BFOQ for sex would be appropriate where the employer’s primary service is “sex or vicarious sexual 
recreation,” because sex and the essential service the employer provides “are inseparable”). Courts 
have held sexual entertainment to be a primary service in cases involving the New York Playboy Club. 
See Schneyer, supra note 63, at 557 n.30. 
 80. See discussion of Wilson infra note 88 and accompanying text. See also Diaz v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the essence of the airline 
employer’s business was to transport passengers and that the “non-mechanical” customer relations 
functions of the flight attendant position, which the airline asserted women performed more effectively 
than men, were “tangential to the essence of the business”); Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. 
of Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (holding that essence of restaurant 
business was to serve food, and restaurant’s marketing strategy of staffing waitperson positions with 
females in “alluring costumes” did not establish a BFOQ for sex); Patti Buchman, Title VII Limits on 
Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 190, 208–09 (1985) (reasoning that, even if viewers aesthetically prefer to watch younger 
anchorwomen, the primary function of a news program is to transmit information, and thus no BFOQ 
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An employer’s effort to harness sex appeal requires not only hiring 
members of a particular sex, but hiring good-looking members of that 
sex81 and accentuating their looks on the job, most likely through 
grooming standards.82 Courts find illegal discrimination in this situation, 
not because an employer has an appearance policy, but because the policy 
imposes unequal burdens on the sexes. In Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 
Inc.,83 the Ninth Circuit found impermissible sex discrimination where the 
employer airline imposed “special appearance rules”—in the form of strict 
weight requirements—on female employees and applicants for the purpose 
of building a reputation as an airline with thin, good-looking flight 
attendants.84 Similarly, the court in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.85 
found sex discrimination where the employer airline limited its flight 
attendant and ticket agent positions to attractive women who met the 
airline’s height and weight standards.86 In Wilson, these hiring practices 
were part of the employer airline’s effort to court its primary market of 
male business travelers with an image as the “Love” airline.87 When a 
male applicant challenged the airline’s hiring policy, the court held that 
neither customer preference for attractive female flight attendants nor the 
airline’s assertion that it had a significant financial stake in hiring only 
individuals who fit with its “Love” campaign justified the sex-based 
discrimination.88 The court reasoned that the predominant duties of the 
exists for sex for the position of television news anchorperson because “sexual identification” is not 
“essential to the artistic integrity of a news program”). 
 81. See Diaz 442 F.2d at 388 (acknowledging that female flight attendants provided a “cosmetic 
effect” that enhanced a “pleasant” flying environment). 
 82. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 n.12 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing cases in 
support of proposition that appearance standards may constitute sex discrimination when they involve 
“demeaning stereotypes as to female characteristics and abilities or stereotypical notions of female 
attractiveness or use of female sexuality to attract business”). For employers to use female sexuality 
for marketing purposes they have to select employees with this in mind and regulate employee looks. 
 83. 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 84. Id. at 606. Female flight attendants were required to weigh in each month. Id. at 604. If a 
flight attendant exceeded the maximum weight, she was placed on a “weight reduction program” 
designed to result in a weight loss of two pounds per week. Id. If she was still over the weight limit 
after a specified period of time, she was suspended, and later terminated. Id. 
 85. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 86. Id. at 293. The finding of sex discrimination was based on the disparate impact of these 
standards on male applicants. 
 87. Id. at 294. Its advertising campaign promised customers “feminine spirit, fun and sex appeal” 
in the flying experience. Id. 
 88. Id. at 302–04. The court rejected the airline’s assertion that feminine sex appeal was 
necessary for the business functions of “attracting and entertaining male passengers” and “fulfilling 
customer expectations for female service” based on its advertising campaign. Id. at 302. The airline 
sought to establish a BFOQ for sex as a defense to the discrimination claim, but the court held neither 
customer preference nor a desire to maximize profits is sufficient to establish a BFOQ for sex. Id. at 
303. To succeed in its BFOQ defense, the airline would have had to show that only females could 
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position of flight attendant involved “mechanical” tasks such as reciting 
safety instructions and serving drinks to passengers89—tasks that had no 
relation to the employee’s sex appeal.90 Most recently, in Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co.,91 a female server who was terminated for failing 
to wear makeup pursuant to the defendant casino’s “Personal Best” 
program92 sued the casino on the theory that the makeup rule violated Title 
VII as disparate treatment sex discrimination.93 While the panel awarded 
summary judgment to the employer, reasoning that the program imposed 
similar burdens on male and female employees, the Ninth Circuit will 
review that decision en banc.94 Thus, for decades, courts have grappled 
with sex discrimination claims rooted in an employer’s regulation of looks 
in the workplace. 
3. Looks and Age 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits age-
based discrimination in employment.95 In addition, discrimination on the 
basis of age-related appearance may be prohibited less directly under Title 
VII where an employer imposes significantly more burdensome physical 
perform a job function that went “to the ‘essence’ of the employer’s business.” Id. at 299. Where a job 
requires several abilities, only some of which are related to sex, the “sex-linked aspects of the job must 
predominate.” Id. at 301. While the court acknowledged that “employee sexuality” served a function in 
the airline’s business, it was insufficient to establish a BFOQ because the dominant function of the 
business was to “transport passengers safely and quickly from one point to another.” Id. at 302. The 
court also cited surveys conducted by the airline that showed that several factors, not just the sexual 
allure of female flight attendants, contributed to customer satisfaction with the airline. Id. at 303. 
 89. Id. at 302. The court further stated that “Love [was] the manner of job performance, not the 
job performed.” Id.  
 90. See also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). Diaz, like 
Wilson, rejected an airline’s argument that its female-only hiring policy for flight attendant positions 
was justified by business goals. Id. at 389. 
 91. 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). Another casino is defending gender discrimination charges, in 
state court in New Jersey, because of its weight policy. See Parmley, supra note 63. 
 92. The program required all servers to be “‘well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and 
body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform.’” 392 
F.3d at 1077. It also required female servers to wear stockings, nail polish, styled hair, and makeup. Id. 
The program prohibited male servers from wearing makeup and colored nail polish and required them 
to wear short haircuts and trimmed nails. Id. Harrah’s enforced the “Personal Best” program by taking 
portrait and full-body pictures of each employee for his or her file after the completion of “Personal 
Best” training. Id. at 1078. These pictures were used as an “‘appearance measurement’ tool” to 
determine whether the servers looked their “Personal Best” on a “daily basis.” Id. 
 93. Id. at 1061. 
 94. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 409 F.3d 1061 (rehearing en banc granted May 13, 
2005). 
 95. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). 
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appearance requirements on one sex than on the other.96 Age 
discrimination claims often “implicitly involve” the plaintiff’s age-related 
appearance.97 Furthermore, looks, age, and sex may combine into an 
employment discrimination cocktail.98 
In Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,99 a female anchorwoman on a television 
news program sought relief for employment discrimination when her 
employer reassigned her to a reporter position after viewer surveys 
indicated dissatisfaction with her looks and performance relative to other 
local anchorwomen.100 The plaintiff proceeded on the legal theory of sex 
discrimination, arguing unsuccessfully that her employer’s appearance 
standards for females, which were more detailed and demanding than 
those for males, were impermissibly based on customer preferences for 
stereotypically feminine and fashionable anchorwomen.101 Age 
discrimination might have provided an alternative claim for the plaintiff, if 
such a claim had been supported by stronger evidence than her employer’s 
disputed statement that she was reassigned in part because she looked “too 
old.”102 
 96. See Buchman, supra note 80, at 203 (explaining how a television news station’s requirement 
that female, but not male, anchors display the “immutable or semi-immutable physical characteristic” 
of youthfulness may constitute impermissible “sex plus” discrimination). 
 97. Adamitis, supra note 25, at 206–07. See also HATFIELD & SPRECHER, supra note 66, at 58 
(suggesting that looks-based discrimination may be the true mechanism underlying age 
discrimination); GORDON L. PATZER, THE PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS PHENOMENA 148 (1985) 
(citing psychology findings, which demonstrate that the face is a central aspect of physical 
attractiveness and that age may be “predominantly displayed in the face”). Given these findings, it may 
be impossible to distinguish whether employment discrimination against older individuals is looks–
based, age–based, or both—yet that distinction makes all the difference as to whether a claimant has a 
valid cause of action. 
 98. See, e.g., Dodd v. Am. Airlines, Inc., CCH EEOC Decisions (1973) ¶ 6001 (finding airline 
employer’s mandatory retirement policy for flight attendants in their early-to-mid-thirties an 
impermissible aspect of its sex discrimination policies), cited in Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 
F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1982). For further discussion of such “compound discrimination,” see Elaine 
Shoben, Compound Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1981). 
 99. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 100. Id. at 1208–09. 
 101. Id. at 1214. The station required female anchorpersons to adhere to a “clothing calendar” 
designed to ensure that they wore a wide variety of fashionable yet conservative clothing on camera. 
Id. at 1209. Male anchorpersons were allowed to wear the same suit more frequently as long as they 
rotated ties. Id. at 1214. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that these appearance standards 
were overly burdensome on females as compared to males and were impermissibly based on customer 
preference. Id. The court found the station’s appearance requirements to be “shaped only by neutral 
professional and technical considerations and not by any stereotypical notions of female roles and 
images.” Id. at 1215–16. It also acknowledged the district court’s assertion that, due to the visual 
nature of the television medium, “reasonable appearance requirements were ‘obviously critical’” to the 
station’s financial success. Id. at 1215. 
 102. Id. at 1212. The district court accepted the employer’s testimony on this point, and the 
appellate court deferred to that factual finding on appeal. Id. 
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4. Looks and Physical Disabilities 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)103 prohibits discrimination 
against individuals on the basis of actual or perceived disabilities.104 The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973105 provides similar protection for individuals 
with real or perceived handicaps in the context of federally funded jobs.106 
Of existing antidiscrimination statutes, the perceived disability provisions 
of these statutes come the closest to offering protection from looks-based 
discrimination.107 First, these statutes include “cosmetic disfigurement” in 
their definitions of “physical impairment” giving rise to a disability.108 
Second, these statutes explicitly target employer misconceptions, often 
based on an individual’s physical appearance, about the individual’s 
ability to perform job duties.109 
Thus far, plaintiffs have made successful employment discrimination 
claims under perceived disability provisions110 where they had dramatic 
distortions of physical appearance, in the form of cosmetic disfigurement 
or morbid obesity. In Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co.,111 a Vermont state 
court found that, because the employer regarded the toothless plaintiff as 
 103. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000). 
 104. The ADA requires an “individualized inquiry” as to whether the individual’s “real or 
imagined” impairment “substantially limit[s] a major life activity” to determine whether that 
impairment qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the Act. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471, 483, 490 (1999). In addition to protecting individuals with actual physical or mental 
disabilities, the ADA protects individuals who are “regarded as” having impairments that substantially 
limit major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)(C); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. If the impairment does 
not rise to the level of a “disability” within the ADA, the impairment is a legitimate criterion for 
employers to consider in employment decisions. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490–91. 
 105. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 106. Id. Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act protects an individual as “handicapped,” even 
where he or she is perfectly capable of performing the job, if the attitudes of others toward the 
impairment affect his or her major life activities. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 
273, 282–83 (1987).  
 107. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2042. Scholars also have advocated the 
use of disability antidiscrimination law to prohibit discrimination against the obese; this is perceived as 
a less drastic step than extending antidiscrimination law to looks-based discrimination. See, e.g., Jane 
Byeff Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25, 28 (1997). 
 108. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2005) (ADA regulations); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (2005), 45 C.F.R. 
§ 84.3(j) (2005) (Rehabilitation Act regulations). 
 109. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2045. Perceived disability protection 
results from “Congress’[s] acknowledg[ment] that society’s accumulated myths and fears about 
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual 
impairment.” Arline, 480 U.S. at 284. 
 110. See supra note 106. 
 111. Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122 (Vt. 1992). A Vermont state court allowed 
the plaintiff to recover under a state statute that defines “handicapped person” identically to the federal 
Rehabilitation Act when her employer terminated her from its housekeeping staff because her upper 
teeth were missing and she refused to wear dentures. Id. at 1130, 1124. 
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unfit for customer contact, the plaintiff was “substantially limited in her 
ability to work” and thus should prevail on her perceived disability 
theory.112 In Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, 
and Hospitals,113 the obese plaintiff prevailed on a perceived disability 
theory because her employer’s refusal to hire her was based on the 
misconception that an aspect of her physical appearance—her weight—
affected her ability to work.114 Implicitly tying weight-as-disability to 
looks and acknowledging the power of looks in employment opportunities, 
the Cook court remarked that a person’s obesity can severely diminish his 
or her employment opportunities “[i]n a society that all too often confuses 
‘slim’ with ‘beautiful’ or ‘good’ . . .”115 
5. Looks and Race 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race.116 Like other protected categories 
previously discussed, race is closely associated with, if not largely defined 
by, certain physical characteristics.117 Disfavoring a particular aspect of 
 112. Id. at 1132. The court reasoned that the Vermont Statute’s definition of “physical 
impairment” included “cosmetic disfigurement” in holding that “the attitudes of others toward such 
impairment” can substantially limit a major life activity. Id. at 1131. The federal Rehabilitation Act 
also contemplates an actionable perceived disability claim where a party seeks to exclude an able 
individual because of concern that the individual’s abnormal physical appearance will have a negative 
impact on others. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.9 (discussing legislative history of the Act and citing 
Representative Vanik’s example of impermissible handicap discrimination where a public school 
sought to exclude an intellectually capable, non-physically threatening child with cerebral palsy 
because of concern that his physical appearance “produced a nauseating effect” on classmates). 
 113. Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993). An 
obese plaintiff recovered for employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act after the court 
upheld a jury’s finding that the defendant “regarded” her as “substantially impaired,” despite her actual 
ability to perform the work. Id. at 25. As part of the application process for the position of attendant at 
an institution for the mentally retarded, the plaintiff underwent a physical examination where a nurse 
found her “morbidly obese” but not limited in her ability to perform the duties of the position. Id. at 
20–21. The employer refused to hire the plaintiff out of fear that “[her] morbid obesity compromised 
her ability to evacuate patients” and placed her at greater risk for health complications that might result 
in costly workers compensation claims for the employer. Id. at 21. 
 114. Id. at 28.  
 115. Id. Cf. Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2000). In Hein, the overweight, 
truck-driver plaintiff brought age and disability discrimination charges against his employer and 
presented evidence that his supervisor had created and circulated a cartoon depicting him as “Big Boy” 
and a magazine cover depicting him as a gorilla with the caption “Wayne Hein Ponders Weight 
Limits.” Id. at 485. He also noted that his coworkers called him various nicknames, including “Buffet 
Boy,” inspired by his weight. Id. Though Michigan is one of the few jurisdictions that prohibits 
weight-based discrimination, the court held that the plaintiff failed to connect the supervisor’s “alleged 
prejudice against heavier individuals” with his termination. Id. at 489. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000). 
 117. See supra notes 74 and 75. However, racial definitions are predominantly understood as 
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looks has a disproportionate impact on any racial or cultural group that 
commonly displays that feature.118 The Gonzalez complaint119 emphasized 
the “all-white” aspects of “the A&F Look”120 and theorized that a causal 
relationship exists between the retailer’s permissible use of looks-related 
criteria in selecting and managing salespeople and impermissible 
employment discrimination against racial minorities.121 An early unnamed 
E.E.O.C. decision122 from the airline industry similarly illustrates how 
easily employment policies utilizing permissible looks-based selection 
criteria may slip into impermissible race discrimination.123 The African 
American plaintiff was denied employment after an interviewer described 
her as “unattractive” with “large lips.”124 The court found that this 
constituted illegal race discrimination because “a substantial factor” in the 
“arbitrary social creatures,” not real, inherent biological differences. Angela P. Harris, Equality 
Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1982, 1988 
(2000). As a practical matter, social constructions of a given race often are defined largely by the 
physical characteristics thought to comprise it—most commonly skin color, but potentially including 
other physical attributes such as height and facial characteristics. See Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 
626 F.2d 659, 667 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding employer’s minimum height standards discriminated 
against Mexican-Americans, whose average height tends to be less than other racial groups). Some 
rationales for racial stereotypes have their roots in Western anxiety toward the color black in symbolic 
contexts. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1372 n.153 (1988) (citing writings 
on the relationship between racial stereotypes and real or perceived differences, i.e., in color, to which 
value is attached).  
 118. See Craig, 626 F.2d at 666 n.6 (finding discrimination in violation of Title VII where 
sheriff’s department imposed minimum height requirements for deputies that eliminated 41% of 
Mexican-American males but only 14% of all other males). 
 119. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, supra note 6. 
 120. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs asserted that A&F’s pursuit of hiring employees who fit “the A&F look” 
results in a “disproportionately white” sales force. Id. ¶ 6. One plaintiff charged that he was denied the 
opportunity to apply for a sales position at A&F because “too many Filipinos” worked at that location 
already. Id. ¶ 48. Five Asian American plaintiffs charged that they were terminated from their sales 
positions at A&F after a corporate A&F group toured the store, showed store managers a picture of a 
white model, and told them that it represented the “A&F Look” and that they should “make [the] store 
look more like this.” Id. ¶ 62. An African American plaintiff charged that, while her official 
assignment was to the sales floor, her primary tasks were “dusting and cleaning windows,” while white 
employees assigned to the same position received more favorable “daytime hours and floor time.” Id. 
¶ 89. 
 121. Plaintiffs alleged that A&F’s Look Policy governs systematic employment practices and 
polices that have “an adverse disparate impact on minority applicants and employees.” Id. ¶ 117. 
 122. E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 70–90, 1969 WL 2903, *1 (1969). 
 123. Id. The airline prescreened prospective flight attendants strictly according to requirements for 
“height, weight, and other measurements.” Interviewers assessed prospective employees on 
dimensions including “complexion,” “make-up,” “hands,” “teeth,” “hair style,” “posture,” 
“appearance,” “poise,” and “attitude.” Id. 
 124. Id. 
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airline’s refusal to hire her was the size of her lips, a race-linked physical 
trait.125  
Complicating a racial minority individual’s ability to recover when an 
employer uses physical characteristics as selection criteria, members of the 
same race vary in the extent to which they display physical characteristics 
common to their race.126 Race discrimination law typically does not reach 
looks-based discrimination within a minority group.127 In Sere v. Bd. of 
Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois,128 the African American plaintiff was 
denied relief for race discrimination when his supervisor declined to renew 
his employment contract and hired, in his place, a lighter-skinned, less 
qualified African American individual.129 The court recognized that skin 
color-based discrimination may happen among individuals of the same 
race but stated that this type of intra-race discrimination is not actionable 
under the civil rights statute.130 The court suggested that it would be 
impractical for courts to attempt to draw fine distinctions based on varying 
skin pigmentations within one race.131 
C. Existing Analogy-Based Application of Rationales Asserted for 
Protecting Race, Sex, Age, and Disability to Looks  
1. Stereotyping as the Mechanism for Discrimination Against 
Protected Categories and Looks-Based Discrimination 
Discrimination occurs in part as a result of a natural cognitive 
mechanism—stereotyping—turned to prejudice, or judgments based on 
 125. Id. 
 126. For a discussion of a similar problem in national origin discrimination claims, see Stephen 
M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164 
(1985). Where an employer denies a position to a member of a certain cultural group and fills the 
position with another member of that group, the denied applicant probably has no claim for 
discrimination, even if the employment decision was motivated by cultural bias. Id. at 1174. Cutler 
notes that national origin groups are heterogeneous, allowing employers to hire those applicants who 
are most “like” them—i.e., most assimilated—over those who are not. Id. at 1166–67. Cutler proposes 
discrimination tests based on trait-defined subgroups of the broad national origin group. Id. at 1174. 
 127. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2057 n.95. Cf. Cutler, supra note 126, at 
1171 (citing decision that plaintiff had a valid cause of action for discrimination where employer chose 
a “light-skinned, caucasian-featured black applicant” over the plaintiff, who was “qualified but dark-
skinned” with African American features). 
 128. Sere v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 129. Id. at 1546. 
 130. Id. The statute was codified at that time as 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
 131. Sere, 628 F. Supp. at 1546. In the court’s language, it did not wish to enter “the unsavory 
business of measuring skin color and determining whether the skin pigmentation of the parties is 
sufficiently different to form the basis of a lawsuit.” Id. 
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negative stereotypes about a group.132 Stereotyping is an everyday mental 
task by which people assign an individual, about whom they know 
nothing, to a category, about which they have gathered a lot of 
information.133 In their innocent form, stereotypes are energy-savers that 
help people accomplish the overwhelming task of processing “an almost 
incomprehensibly complex social world.”134 Stereotyping has costs,135 
however, and the risk of inaccuracy is foremost among them.136 Because 
stereotyping occurs on an unconscious level, its inaccuracies can be 
particularly difficult to combat.137 Stereotypes associated with race, sex, 
and other protected characteristics are understood to be a major 
mechanism in the various forms of discrimination these groups face.138 
Similarly, scholars have argued that employers’ dependence on looks 
as an employee selection criterion likely stems from an “attractiveness 
stereotype.”139 The attractiveness stereotype leads individuals to assume 
 132. See Adamitis, supra note 25, at 213. Adamitis notes that a central purpose of 
antidiscrimination law is to fight prejudice that results in unfair disadvantage for members of 
negatively stereotyped groups. Id. 
 133. In his article on antidiscrimination law, Professor Rubin notes that generalizing about a 
person on the basis of his or her characteristics is both a routine and necessary part of functioning in a 
social world where people participate in many interactions every day. Rubin, supra note 36, at 572. 
Psychologists agree and have explained how stereotype categories are formed from knowledge 
gathered in the past which supplies a set of characteristics that people then ascribe to unknown 
individuals based on their group membership. See C. Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne & Galen V. 
Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1994). 
 134. Macrae et al., supra note 133, at 37. 
 135. Id. at 45. 
 136. See Alan Feingold, Good-Looking People Are Not What We Think, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
304, 333 (1992). Contrary to the assumptions of the attractiveness stereotype, psychology professor 
Alan Feingold found “no notable relationships between physical attractiveness and basic personality 
traits,” but personality traits having to do with social behavior were linked to physical attractiveness. 
Id. He also found negligible correlation between physical attractiveness and cognitive measures. Id. 
 137. KOPPELMAN, supra note 34, at 129 (explaining that unconscious prejudices, associated with 
natural categorizing, can affect even neutrally-structured decision-making processes). 
 138. Id. Moreover, stereotypes are self-perpetuating because people go beyond merely assuming 
that group members possess the stereotypical characteristics of the group and proceed actively to treat 
them as if they possess those qualities, resulting in a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by which group 
members may actually develop these qualities. The “self-fulfilling prophecy” phenomenon was first 
named in a classic study in which experimenters randomly selected certain children from a grade 
school class and informed their teachers that a test had revealed that these children were “late 
bloomers” whose IQs could be expected to improve dramatically within the year. The teachers’ 
expectations for IQ-improvement turned into a reality, not as a result of the students’ intellectual 
ability, but more likely as a result of the greater attention teachers paid to those students who happened 
to be labeled as “late bloomers.” ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSEN, PYGMALION IN THE 
CLASSROOM (1968). For a similar, classic study in the context of the attractiveness stereotype, see 
Mark Snyder, Elizabeth D. Tanke, & Ellen Berscheid, Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: 
On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656 (1977). 
 139. See Adamitis, supra note 25, at 197; Alice H. Eagly et al., What Is Beautiful Is Good, but. . .: 
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that those who possess physical beauty also possess a host of other 
positive characteristics,140 including intelligence141 and social 
competence.142 At the same time as attractive individuals benefit from 
positive stereotypes, unattractive people are negatively stereotyped in 
various ways; people may attribute psychological disturbance to them, 
and, in general, may think that “what is ugly is deviant.”143 Human bias in 
favor of attractive individuals may be innate.144  
Stereotypes often have an element of accuracy,145 either because they 
are properly founded or because they have created a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.146 Despite their potential accuracy in some circumstances, 
stereotypes are an improper basis for employment decisions about 
members of protected categories because of their general danger of 
inaccuracy and their potential to foster stigmatization of the excluded 
group.147 Proponents of extending antidiscrimination law to cover looks-
based discrimination have asserted that negative stereotypes associated 
with looks148 are perpetuated by the same process and carry the same 
dangers as those associated with race and sex.149 
A Meta-Analytic Review of Research on the Physical Attractiveness Stereotype, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
109 (1991). 
 140. Eagly, supra note 139. 
 141. Margaret M. Clifford & Elaine Walster, Research Note: The Effect of Physical Attractiveness 
on Teacher Expectations, 46 SOC. OF EDUC. 248 (1973). 
 142. Eagly, supra note 139, at 109–10. 
 143. HATFIELD & SPRECHER, supra note 66, at 82. See also PATZER, supra note 97, at 44 (citing 
study finding that a person’s likelihood of being perceived as psychologically disturbed increases as 
the person’s physical attractiveness decreases). Rubin asserts that, where nonmembers of a protected 
group argue that antidiscrimination law unfairly creates “special rights” for that group, their sense of 
unfairness may be based in the feeling that the protected group is contaminated or corrupt. Rubin, 
supra note 36, at 588. Thus, “special rights” arguments against antidiscrimination provisions often 
confirm the existence of the very “irrational prejudice” that justifies legal protection for these groups. 
Id. at 591. 
 144. Judith H. Langlois et al., Facial Diversity and Infant Preferences for Attractive Faces, 27 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 79, 84 (1991). Langlois found that infants gazed longer at photographs of 
attractive faces than photographs of unattractive faces, regardless of the race, gender, or age of the 
person in the photograph. Id. at 84. Her findings suggested that the preference for attractive individuals 
is “either innate or acquired with only minimal experiences with faces in the environment,” rather than 
learned from prolonged exposure to culture. Id. The infants’ consistent preference for the same 
attractive faces also rebuts conventional wisdom that beauty is wholly subjective, or “in the eye of the 
beholder.” Id. 
 145. See Rubin, supra note 36, at 573 (noting that generalizations may be accurate in certain 
social situations). 
 146. See supra note 138 (discussing self-fulfilling prophecy). 
 147. For example, Title VII prohibits an employer from “refus[ing] to hire an individual woman or 
man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.” Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 
333 (1977). 
 148. Assuming that “excess weight” can be a form of unattractiveness, for example, Adamitis 
notes that inaccurate work-related stereotypes associated with obesity include “laziness, lack of 
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2. Irrational Decision-Making as the Process for Discrimination 
Against Protected Categories and Looks-Based Discrimination  
Scholars have argued that allowing looks-based discrimination is 
inconsistent with antidiscrimination law’s commitment to equal 
opportunity through merit-based decisions by employers.150 The idea that 
employers should focus on internal qualifications rather than external 
appearances permeates antidiscrimination law.151 Race, sex, age, and 
disability, like looks, are overwhelmingly physical, readily apparent 
attributes152 that cannot predict ability to perform most job duties.153 The 
use of non-performance-related criteria in selecting employees is irrational 
and could diminish productivity.154 
3. Unfair Stigma and Diminished Opportunities as the Products of 
Discrimination Against Protected Categories and Looks-Based 
Discrimination 
A major tenet of antidiscrimination law is that individuals should not 
suffer employment penalties for unchangeable aspects of their person.155 
discipline, incompetence, lack of productivity, and slovenliness.” Adamitis, supra note 25, at 197. 
 149. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2035. 
 150. See, e.g., Adamitis, supra note 25; Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 25. 
Antidiscrimination law attempts to require employers to focus on “individual merit.” Post, supra note 
35, at 13. Through Title VII, Congress directs that employee selection tests “must measure the person 
for the job” rather than the person abstracted as a member of a particular stereotyped group. Id. at 14 
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)). 
 151. Adamitis, supra note 25, at 212 (arguing that the “ideal” hire is the person best qualified for 
the job).  
 152. Patzer asserts that looks are such a powerful variable in human interactions because, like race 
and sex, looks are an “obvious and immediately accessible trait.” PATZER, supra note 97, at 9. 
 153. See Adamitis, supra note 25, at 195–96. Describing how physically unattractive people 
experience many of the same hardships as minority groups, one scholar writes, “[a]lthough our society 
professes a commitment to judge people by their inner worth, physically unattractive people often face 
differential and unequal treatment in situations in which their appearance is unrelated to their 
qualifications or abilities.” Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2037. See also Adamitis, 
supra note 25, at 212–13 (asserting that there is “no correlation” between appearance and job 
performance in most jobs and citing a study showing that employee weight does not impact most job 
duties). 
 154. Even if it would increase profits, however, Adamitis notes that “customer preference” is 
generally rejected as a justification for discrimination. Adamitis, supra note 25 at 213. She suggests 
that legislatures should extend this level of protection to looks-based discrimination. Id. 
 155. There are exceptions to this principle, most notably intelligence. Barro analogizes looks and 
intelligence and argues that the law should not interfere with the market in these attributes. Barro, 
supra note 68, at 18. If society determines that poor looks are unfairly and irrationally stigmatized, 
however, such a finding could justify bringing looks within the protection of antidiscrimination law. It 
would be consistent for intelligence to remain a valid employment selection criterion, if core job duties 
require a certain level of intelligence, and particularly if no similarly severe stigma attaches to low 
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Race, sex, age, disability, and looks can be classified as immutable and 
interlinked characteristics.156 Proponents of prohibiting looks-based 
discrimination have noted that looks, like protected categories, involve 
immutable or semi-immutable traits that are irrelevant to job duties and for 
which individuals should not be penalized in the labor market.157 Due to 
scientific advances, however, it is not always clear what traits are 
mutable.158 Consequently, mutable physical traits associated with 
protected categories and looks both raise the common question of how to 
allocate the burdens between employers and employees when procedures 
are available to change one’s appearance but pose various degrees of cost, 
invasion, and risk to the individual.159 
A related justification for extending legal protections to various 
categories is that their members face a legacy of discrimination160 that 
continues to restrict their field of opportunities.161 Scholars have 
intelligence. See supra notes 41 and 44 for alternative formulations of the social calculus that may 
explain when and why protection should extend to any given characteristic. 
 156. See, e.g., Buchman, supra note 80, at 197 (noting that race and age are both “virtually 
unalterable” facets of a person’s physical appearance). 
 157. See, e.g., Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2035. “Generalizations based on 
immutable personal traits . . . are especially frustrating because we can do nothing to escape their 
operation.” Brest, supra note 38, at 10. 
 158. See Buchman, supra note 80, at 198. Buchman notes that the availability of cosmetic surgery 
may make physical signs of age “[s]emi-[i]mmutable [c]haracteristics.” Id. Similarly, the debate over 
the degree to which weight is within an individual’s control renders its mutability status unclear. Id. 
 159. This raises several questions that are beyond the scope of this Note: To what extent may an 
employer require an employee to take steps to alter his or her appearance in order to fit the job 
description? The possibilities range from requiring the employee to use cosmetics, or take prescription 
medication (e.g., for acne), or undergo prolonged medical treatment (e.g., orthodontics), or agree to 
surgery. Similarly, this Note does not address the extent to which job descriptions should be broad 
enough to encompass variations in appearance. 
 Some argue that even mutable characteristics should be protected where they are closely tied to 
group identity. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 126, at 1177–78 (stating that allowing discrimination on 
the basis of mutable national-origin traits is “antithetical to our notion of equality” because forcing 
group members to assimilate is stigmatizing and sends the message that the person’s identity “has no 
place in American society”). This argument can be extended to personal identity or self-expression. 
The Santa Cruz ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “physical characteristic” refused 
to go so far, over the protestation of locals seeking to protect their ability to control their self-
presentation “through choices of hair color, tattoos, or clothing.” Post, supra note 35, at 6. 
 160. African Americans, for example, have suffered the ill effects of a deeply entrenched race 
consciousness in America. Crenshaw, supra note 117, at 1374–76 (tracing the history and power of 
“politicized racial categories” in America from slavery through the 1980s). 
 161. The “psychological injury” individuals suffer when they are judged by generalizations about 
a group to which they belong are “compounded by the frustrating and cumulative nature of . . . 
material injuries” such as lost job opportunities. Brest, supra note 38, at 10. Arguing that the harms of 
race discrimination have been uniquely severe because blacks suffered a historical legacy of being 
“denied virtually all opportunities,” he asserts that “[a] person who is denied one opportunity because 
he or she is short or overweight will find other opportunities, for in our society height and weight do 
not often serve as the basis for generalizations determining who will receive benefits.” Id. (emphasis in 
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documented the individual and social damage attributable to looks-based 
discrimination.162 Studies demonstrate that unattractive individuals suffer 
significant harm in the labor market due to stereotypes associated with 
their appearance.163 Given the firmly entrenched and possibly innate164 
nature of the attractiveness stereotype,165 the harm is long-standing and 
likely to continue.166 It is particularly damaging for women.167 Finally, 
exacerbating this problem, people tend to deny that lookism exists and do 
not believe that physical appearance affects their judgment.168 Thus, 
members of already protected categories and victims of looks-based 
discrimination experience a similar type and degree of harm. The complex, 
cyclical nature of that harm arguably makes it an appropriate subject for 
legal intervention. 
original). But see Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2041 (reporting State of Maryland’s 
Commission on Human Relations’s finding that employers’ biases against overweight persons are so 
strong “that it may well be easier to place a thin black person on a job than a fat white person”). 
 162. See, e.g., Adamitis, supra note 25, at 198–99. This Note would not pretend to weigh the 
harms suffered by members of protected groups against those suffered by individuals who have 
experienced looks-based discrimination, only to draw attention to the similarities between the two. 
 163. Hamermesh & Biddle, supra note 66. See also Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 31, 
at 92–96 (discussing findings that attractive women receive higher salaries, better performance 
evaluations, and more earnings over time as compared to unattractive women, and in particular noting 
that attractive people tend to be favored over people with a better work record at promotion time); 
Adamitis, supra note 25, at 198 (citing several studies that show correlations between attractiveness 
and earnings, widespread employment discrimination against overweight individuals, and lower 
incomes for shorter men). 
 164. Psychologist and Harvard Medical School professor Nancy Etcoff argues that humans’ 
“extreme sensitivity to beauty is hard-wired,” because physical attributes we call “beautiful” emerged 
as signals of reproductive success through the process of natural selection. ETCOFF, supra note 75, at 
24. See also supra note 144 (discussing infants’ preference for attractive faces). Etcoff notes, however, 
that the “economically dominant group” of a country establishes its “own ethnic features as the 
standard of beauty” in that country, so that the features considered attractive in any given society vary 
depending on who “holds the reins of power” in that society. ETCOFF, supra note 75, at 117. 
 165. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 166. The “cycle of discrimination” against individuals with attributes that carry negative social 
stereotypes continues in part because qualified individuals may expect to be unable to find 
employment and thus are deterred from trying, leading to underachievement in other aspects of their 
lives. Adamitis, supra note 25, at 214. 
 167. See generally NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED 
AGAINST WOMEN (1991). In describing how pressure to meet the cultural ideal of beauty increases 
women’s susceptibility to eating disorders, one author reports survey findings that a majority of 
American women claimed they felt less afraid of dying than of “getting fat.” DEBRA L. GIMLIN, BODY 
WORK: BEAUTY AND SELF-IMAGE IN AMERICAN CULTURE 4 (2002). 
 168. PATZER, supra note 97, at 43. Contrast this resistance to acknowledge the role of 
“superficial” characteristics in human interactions to the large amounts of time and money many 
Americans spend in efforts to improve their looks. Id. at 10. See also Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, 
supra note 31, at 91–92. 
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4. Feasibility of Prohibiting Discrimination Against Protected 
Categories and Looks-Based Discrimination 
While folk wisdom asserts that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” 
scholars and scientists have attacked the idea that beauty is inherently 
subjective and immeasurable.169 Studies show that assessments of physical 
attractiveness are remarkably consistent across raters, even when raters are 
from different cultures, suggesting that beauty is in large part an objective 
quality.170 Whether this consistency is due to a common social 
judgment,171 biological preference,172 or a combination of both, the 
objectivity of attractiveness makes it measurable. Because looks, like race, 
sex, age, and disability, are measurable and outwardly apparent,173 some 
have argued that legal protection against lookism is feasible.174 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Drawing Lines: Why Current Antidiscrimination Law Protects the 
Disfigured but Not the Homely 
Existing antidiscrimination law fails to reach looks-based 
discrimination, even though this is inconsistent with the policies of 
rationality and fairness that underlie legal protection for other stigmatized 
characteristics unrelated to ability to perform key job duties.175 In 
principle, and consistent with utopian aspirations, looks-based 
discrimination should be prohibited.176 However, principle alone has 
 169. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2048; see also Meg Gehrke, Is Beauty the 
Beast?, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 221, 229–30 (1994) (describing a “universal concept of 
physical beauty for the human body” that includes symmetry of features). 
 170. See Michael R. Cunningham et al., “Their Ideas of Beauty Are, on the Whole, the Same as 
Ours”: Consistency and Variability in the Cross-Cultural Perception of Female Physical 
Attractiveness, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 261–62 (1995). 
 171. Social scientists theorize that “social consensus” defines beauty. Feingold, supra note 136, at 
304. 
 172. Evolutionary psychologists suggest that people tend to find the same physical traits beautiful 
because, over the course of evolution, these traits emerged as signals of “reproductive success.” 
ETCOFF, supra note 75, at 24. 
 173. Among the measurable determinants of physical attractiveness are dimensions of the 
physique and face. See PATZER, supra note 97, at 154, 159–60. (citing studies that consistently find 
high physical attractiveness ratings for certain face, nose, and lip shapes, hair colors, skin tones, and 
components of physique such as weight distribution and build). 
 174. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2048 (noting that expert witnesses could 
use the measurability of facial features and consensus on attractiveness ratings to support a factual 
finding that an individual’s looks constituted an impairment). 
 175. See supra Part II.A. 
 176. See discussion supra Part II.C.1–4 (recounting the most commonly asserted rationales for 
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proven insufficient grounds to establish a protected status for looks,177 
given the burdens such a prohibition would entail.178  
Under theories that envision antidiscrimination law as socially 
transformative,179 a legal prohibition needs firmer grounding than the fact 
that generalizations based on a certain attribute are irrational or lead to 
unfair results for those individuals who display them.180 Rather, society 
must decide that a certain attribute warrants legal protection from 
discrimination despite the costs—cultural and financial—that the 
extension of such protection entails.181 Scholarship, as well as public 
expressions of distaste for looks-based employment policies, such as those 
alleged in the Gonzalez complaint, suggest that physical appearance may 
be such an attribute.182 To date, however, these arguments have not 
inspired any widespread legislative movement to elevate lookism from its 
current position of questionable taste to a legally protected category.183 
The social transformation-based theories of antidiscrimination law explain 
that lookism in employment is legal because of a social determination that 
the cultural practice of looks-based discrimination has value that 
outweighs the costs elucidated by its critics to date.184  
prohibiting looks-based discrimination, based on analogies between looks-based discrimination and 
discrimination against various protected categories). 
 177. See supra note 25 (explaining that only a few jurisdictions have prohibited looks-based 
discrimination in employment). 
 178. Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2037. Burdens of definition include the lack 
of a “cohesive” class of “unattractive” individuals. Id. Burdens of enforcement are common to other 
protected categories. For example, an employer’s discriminatory motive is difficult to prove because it 
exists as a state of mind. See Rubin, supra note 36, at 582–83. Moreover, even the employer may not 
be aware of all the motives underlying his or her decisions. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the 
unconscious nature of stereotypes). 
 179. See supra Part II.A (discussing Koppelman’s and Post’s theories). 
 180. See supra note 44. 
 181. See supra note 45 (describing scope of “antidiscrimination project” according to 
Koppelman). 
 182. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Some scholars have argued the same. See 
Adamitis, supra note 25, and Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24. 
 183. See Adamitis, supra note 25, at 209–11 (finding statutory or local prohibitions on looks-
based discrimination in only three jurisdictions). The current failure to prohibit looks-based 
discrimination can also be explained under the institutional theory. Under this view, antidiscrimination 
law’s failure to protect looks is a decision to let a range of social institutions, including employers, 
resolve the “social dispute[]” about fairness among the beautiful, the homely, and the average. See 
Hills, supra note 42, at 1615. 
 184. “Antidiscrimination law always begins and ends in history, which means that it must 
participate in the very practices that it seeks to alter and to regulate.” Post, supra note 35, at 17. Under 
Post’s “sociological” view of antidiscrimination law, the law transforms other social practices “by 
reconstructing the social identities of persons.” Id. at 31. 
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1. The Administrative Value of Permitting Looks-Based 
Discrimination 
Because looks vary so widely among people and because of the 
widespread (if incorrect) idea that attractiveness involves subjective 
judgments,185 it is difficult to define protected categories of looks for the 
purposes of antidiscrimination law.186 Lawmakers could minimize these 
difficulties, however, by treating unattractiveness as a perceived disability 
under the case-by-case analysis used in disability litigation.187 
Nonetheless, discriminatory motives are often difficult to detect and prove 
even in cases where the plaintiff’s membership in a protected category is 
undisputed;188 this difficulty could be compounded if the law recognized 
claims for looks-based discrimination.189 Ultimately, limiting legal relief 
to current categories minimizes complication in the law.190 
2. The Social Value of Permitting Looks-Based Discrimination 
A legal prohibition on looks-based discrimination would prompt a 
major change in how people think about and relate to each other.191 
 185. See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text. 
 186. These include the conceptual difficulty of grouping the “physically unattractive” into a 
“cohesive” class and the idea that physical attractiveness “exists on a continuum.” Note, Facial 
Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2037. 
 187. See id. at 2042 (asserting that handicap discrimination law is the “legal rubric most likely to 
afford general protection for appearance discrimination victims”). Among the benefits to using this 
existing legislation to remedy the harms of looks-based discrimination are its “individualized inquiry,” 
which avoids the difficulty of defining various types of unattractiveness. Id. at 2047. Under the 
language of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, courts would employ a test of “whether the person’s 
appearance constituted ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities’ 
or leads him or her to be treated as if this were so.” Id. Adamitis similarly argues that “[c]oncerns of 
overinclusiveness, excessive litigation, and difficulty of proof are dispelled by requiring” alleged 
victims of looks-based discrimination to “follow existing formulas” to establish their claims. Adamitis, 
supra note 25, at 222. 
 188. An employer’s discriminatory motive is difficult to detect and easy to hide, presenting a 
challenge for plaintiffs who must prove discriminatory intent in order to recover. See Harris, supra 
note 117, at 2010; Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2046–48. 
 189. See Vo, supra note 25, at 355. 
 190. Brest asserts that protecting all stigmatized or disadvantaged individuals would “affect an 
enormously wide range of practices important to the efficient operation of a complex industrial 
society.” Brest, supra note 38, at 11. Of course, efficiency is not always a sufficient decision-making 
rationale, either for employers or for legislators. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 
2051. 
 191. Post questions whether anyone really has any “idea what it would mean physically to 
encounter a person and nevertheless to treat him in a way that renders irrelevant his face, voice, body, 
and gestures. In what sense does a person without an appearance remain a person?” Post, supra note 
35, at 12. He argues that the Santa Cruz ordinance, which prohibited discrimination based on personal 
appearance, was so “severely” abstracted from “everyday social life” as to be impossible to imagine in 
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Society depends on certain embedded stereotypes in order to function, so 
it is reluctant to give up looks as a measure of value.192 Private institutions 
have an economic incentive to discriminate in favor of good-looking 
employees, as the power of the stereotype and the value attached to good 
looks are lucrative.193 Furthermore, adding looks to the list of attributes 
employers must ignore in their decision-making process could lead to the 
negative moral consequence of removing a degree of humanity from 
individuals’ interactions.194 Thus, employers are allowed to use looks-
based selection criteria because society derives considerable value from 
the schema in which looks, as a proxy for other attributes, help define and 
distinguish individuals as they meet and interact with each other every 
day.195  
B. Blurring Lines: Recognizing the Interconnections Between Looks and 
Protected Characteristics 
Of necessity, the law protects discrete categories of persons from 
discrimination.196 In reality, however, discrimination frequently occurs 
because of multiple, interconnected, mutually reinforcing motives.197 The 
practice. Id. at 31. 
 192. Deciding to protect a certain group or characteristic from discrimination is no small matter, 
as it removes from the established set of decision-making criteria a characteristic that may “form the 
basis for an accurate generalization.” Rubin, supra note 36, at 573. Post similarly asserts that the 
“logic of American antidiscrimination law” forces employers to disregard certain “socially powerful 
and salient attributes” of their employees. Post, supra note 35, at 11–12.  
 193. See PATZER, supra note 97, at 187. Empirical data supports employers’ inclination that it 
pays to use attractiveness as a selection criterion for public contact positions. See, e.g., Eagly, supra 
note 139, at 121–22 (finding that good-looking people are more likely to be perceived as socially 
competent, especially by strangers). Physically attractive people have more social influence than 
others; they are better liked and are perceived to have a host of positive characteristics unrelated to 
looks, and they are more likely to elicit positive responses from, and persuade, other people. PATZER, 
supra note 97, at 187 (citing studies). 
 194. Post reasons that, with each attribute employers are forced to ignore, they come to see 
employees less as humans and more as instruments. Post, supra note 35, at 15. See also supra note 43. 
Protecting one category can also cause resentment among those nonmembers who perceive an unfair 
creation of “special rights” for the newly protected group. See Rubin, supra note 36, at 564.  
 195. Consider Hills’s argument that society is “committed to tolerating a lot of stigma based on 
involuntary traits, because we value the attitudes that underlie such stigma”: to eliminate appearance-
based discrimination would entail the sizable, costly task of ridding ourselves “of innumerable 
attitudes about beauty, health, intellect, and human merit generally—attitudes that have higher value 
than the cost of the injustice that we incur on their behalf.” Hills, supra note 42, at 1605. 
 196. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (2004) 
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
 197. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2051 (asserting that a “significant aspect 
of prejudice” against racial minorities, the elderly, or disabled people is “a negative reaction to the way 
they look”). 
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casino server and flight attendant sex discrimination cases exemplify the 
co-occurrence of discrimination on multiple dimensions: sex, weight, 
height, and physical attractiveness.198 Gerdom199 and Wilson200 show the 
difficulty of establishing a business-related link between an employee’s 
physical characteristics, including but not limited to sex, and job duties—
even in a service industry where the aesthetic effect of the staff enhances 
customer satisfaction and reinforces company image.201 The cases also 
demonstrate courts’ willingness to subordinate an employer’s desire to 
market its image by hiring only attractive members of a protected class to 
plaintiffs’ right to equal employment opportunities.202 In short, the 
discrimination in these cases was not just about the protected category of 
sex. Similarly, the A&F Look Policy, and the Gonzalez suit and settlement 
arising from it, are not just about race. More deeply, they demonstrate the 
extent of the troubling connection between lookism, (or culturally shaped 
definitions of attractiveness), sex discrimination, and race discrimination 
(legislatively determined to be the most invidious form of differential 
treatment).203  
Social transformation-based theories of antidiscrimination law envision 
a goal of achieving fairness by eliminating stigma: not only on the 
superficial level of hiring decisions made with an eye toward legal 
compliance, but on the deeper level of how individuals perceive each 
other.204 The law will accomplish this ambitious goal most effectively by 
identifying the true impetus, however complex, behind discrimination.205 
Legal tolerance for looks-based discrimination permits employers to adopt 
 198. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
 199. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602,609 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 200. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 303 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 201. See supra note 88. 
 202. Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 609; Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 294. See also Diaz v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 203. See supra note 39 and supra Part II.B.5. 
 204. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The social transformation occurs through a fake-
it-till-you-make-it process. At first, employers may have a strong discriminatory impulse but are 
disciplined to make nondiscriminatory decisions for the sake of complying with the law. Through 
repetition, the legally coerced nondiscriminatory behavior erodes the impulse. Meanwhile, consistently 
seeing diverse individuals fill a variety of positions causes third parties, such as customers, to question 
and eventually abandon their own discriminatory presuppositions. Cf. Rubin, supra note 36, at 571, 
573 (asserting that antidiscrimination laws are a “second-best solution” because their power is limited 
to stopping employers from giving effect to the “discriminatory impulse”). 
 205. See Post, supra note 35, at 33. The “doctrinal structure of the law” works best when judges 
can “explain the actual justifications for their decisions.” Id. (writing in the context of “sex plus” 
discrimination claims and judges’ unwillingness to use Title VII to prohibit gender-specific grooming 
codes). Judges cannot do this if they find for plaintiffs where the facts indicate discriminatory motives 
that overlap with, but are not directly articulated in, the list of recognized discrimination claims. 
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policies that risk giving rise to forms of decidedly condemned 
discrimination.206 If suits by protected plaintiffs, most recently manifested 
in Gonzalez and in the casino cases, persist in suggesting that looks-based 
discrimination intertwines with forms of discrimination that society 
decidedly condemns, the cost-benefit analysis of the lookism schema may 
need to be revised. The mounting evidence that lookism may not be worth 
it, after all, may lead to a serious reconsideration of its unprotected status 
in antidiscrimination law. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
A. Grounding a Prohibition of Looks-Based Discrimination on Observed 
Associations, in Addition to Analogies 
To date, proponents of a prohibition on looks-based discrimination in 
employment have relied on drawing analogies between impermissible 
forms of discrimination and lookism.207 In order to justify the prohibition 
more convincingly, proponents should focus instead on the observed 
association between looks-based discrimination and decidedly condemned 
forms of discrimination. 
First, eliminating looks-based discrimination is a crucial component of 
eliminating other forms of discrimination. Even if the current social 
consensus is that the value of lookism in employment exceeds the damage 
it causes,208 society has vested the law with responsibility for combating 
other forms of discrimination, especially race discrimination.209 Future 
race discrimination claims may face an obstacle as American society’s 
increasing heterogeneity makes courts less willing to demarcate the 
contours of various minority groups.210 If, as a practical matter, race is 
identified largely by aspects of physical appearance,211 a prohibition on 
looks-based discrimination may provide a more precise way to combat 
race discrimination.212 
 206. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 207. See supra Part II.C.1–4. 
 208. See supra Part III.A.1–2.  
 209. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 210. See Harris, supra note 117, at 2013 (citing Supreme Court’s assertion in McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 316 n.39 (1987), that “the national ‘majority’ is composed of various minority groups, 
most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private 
individuals” and that providing a remedy for all might prove too complicated). 
 211. See supra notes 75, 117. 
 212. This could be true for looks and sex discrimination, as well. Cases involving “sex plus” 
discrimination have proven problematic for courts applying Title VII. See Post, supra note 35, at 33–
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Second, distinct legal protection against looks-based discrimination 
would facilitate more precise definitions of plaintiffs’ claims and would 
characterize defendants’ motive more accurately. Looks-based 
discrimination motivates and facilitates other forms of discrimination.213 
Many instances of race, sex, age, and disability discrimination involve 
significant underlying looks-based stereotypes.214 Moreover, when an 
employer uses looks-based criteria in evaluating employees and 
applicants, the same lookist mindset leads to very different legal results 
depending on the fortuity of whether or not a plaintiff belongs to a 
protected class215 or, in the case of race discrimination, where a plaintiff 
falls along the continuum of extremity of attributes of the protected 
class.216 Current law forces plaintiffs to contrive looks-based 
discrimination incidents into claims that fail to reach the root of the harm. 
Where the application of an antidiscrimination provision does not reflect 
“the real nature of the prejudice,” it risks leaving vulnerable some class 
members whom the law should protect.217 Recognizing claims for looks-
based discrimination would be more accurate than the current practice, and 
accurate characterization of the motive and the harm is important to both 
34. 
 213. For example, given the asserted business goals of providing a pleasant environment for 
customers in the flight attendant sex discrimination cases, it is logical to assume that looks were the 
primary employee selection criterion. See supra Part II.B.2. See also supra note 197. 
 214. Cases involving looks-based discrimination and discrimination against a protected category 
frame it the other way around, and assert looks-based discrimination as a manifestation of illegal 
discrimination, for the purpose of constructing an actionable claim. It is equally plausible that looks-
based discrimination is the underlying practice, and illegal discrimination is a manifestation or 
byproduct of that practice. For example, Schneyer suggests that opponents of Hooters, a restaurant 
with scantily clad, large-chested (and thus predominately female) waitstaff, “couch their arguments in 
terms of ‘sex discrimination in employment’” only because laws prohibiting sex discrimination are “all 
they have to work with” in their attack on the restaurant’s perceived commodification of female 
sexuality. Schneyer, supra note 63, at 569, 571–72. The “commodification of sexual display” is not 
illegal, but is a subject of cultural debate because some people find it highly offensive or unethical. Id. 
at 571. American law, however, “pretends not to speak on cultural issues.” Id. at 572. According to 
Schneyer, the “language” writers use in discussing the Hooters sex discrimination claim of males who 
were denied waitstaff positions is “couched in technical terms such as employment discrimination, 
about which we can pretend that we do not have a cultural or spiritual attachment.” Id. at 572–73.  
 215. See Note, Facial Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2044–45. It is incongruous for the same 
intent to be legally prohibited when used against one applicant or employee but merely socially 
questionable when used against another.  
 216. See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing Sere, the Illinois case in which a court held that a 
prohibition on race discrimination does not prohibit intra-race discrimination against darker skin 
pigmentation). 
 217. See Cutler, supra note 126, at 1165 (arguing that national origin discrimination law fails to 
protect the less assimilated members of any given ancestry by allowing employers to prefer more 
assimilated members of that ancestry).  
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effective jurisprudence218 and the socially transformative goals of 
antidiscrimination law.219  
In reality, several types of discrimination often co-occur in the same 
incident.220 Plaintiffs may proceed on multiple and alternate theories of 
recovery; however, when looks-based discrimination is the underlying 
mental process and motive, two troubling events occur. First, plaintiffs 
who happen to be members of protected categories attempt to couch their 
claim within that category.221 Second, plaintiffs who are not members of 
protected categories suffer the same harm at the hands of the same stigma 
but have no remedy. Both Jesperson and Craft illustrate the difficulties a 
plaintiff may encounter in trying to recover for looks-based discrimination 
through a claim for discrimination against a protected category.222 Even if 
the plaintiff succeeds in recovering as a member of a protected class where 
the discrimination involves significant elements of lookism, his or her 
need for justice remains at least partly unsatisfied when the court’s opinion 
fails to articulate and condemn the employer’s primary discriminatory 
motive.223 
B. Emphasizing the Social Benefits of a Legal Prohibition on Looks-Based 
Discrimination 
In addition to focusing on observed associations and drawing analogies 
between looks-based discrimination and discrimination against protected 
categories, proponents of a prohibition on looks-based discrimination 
should emphasize the social benefits of legal protection from lookism. 
First, a prohibition on looks-based discrimination would diminish 
individuals’ feelings of inadequacy and thereby increase their productivity. 
 218. See supra note 205. 
 219. Under the transformational theory of antidiscrimination law, the motivation for the 
discrimination matters. See supra Part II.A. While they operate by the same cognitive mechanisms, 
looks-based discrimination relies on different stereotypes and social norms than race-based 
discrimination. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 220. See supra Part IV.B. 
 221. See supra note 214. 
 222. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting plaintiff’s sex 
discrimination claim where casino employer required female servers to wear makeup and styled hair); 
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim 
where television station employer demoted her after viewer surveys rated her appearance less 
favorably than other anchorwomen). The Jespersen decision, however, is set for rehearing en banc. 
See supra note 94. While the Craft court felt that the employer television station placed an 
“overemphasis” on appearance, it insisted that the court was “not the proper forum” to determine the 
proper balance of “substance” and “image” in the industry. Id. at 1215. 
 223. See supra note 205. 
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An individual’s self-assessment of his or her physical attractiveness may 
affect the way that individual experiences and interacts with the world.224 
An individual who sees herself as physically attractive is likely to cultivate 
a host of other positive traits.225 Women in particular often experience 
their looks as “symbolic of their characters.”226 On the other hand, an 
employment system that requires individuals to attempt to mold their 
physical appearance into a narrowly defined look takes a financial, 
physical, and emotional toll.227 Prohibiting looks-based discrimination 
would lead to a broader conception of beauty, giving individuals the 
confidence to apply themselves to any occupation where their strengths 
will be utilized. In time, the development of new norms would 
deemphasize the importance of looks as a measure of value, freeing 
resources formerly devoted to personal appearance analysis for other uses. 
Second, a prohibition on looks-based discrimination would increase 
diversity in the workplace, further contributing to individuals’ self-
acceptance and productivity. A diversity of persons in public contact 
positions has a positive impact, not only on employees’ self-concept, but 
also on customers’ self-concept when they see similarly situated others in 
desirable positions.228 Diversity also offers a commercial advantage to 
companies, allowing them to tap into the “purchasing power” of various 
groups.229 Finally, for the entire society, diversity increases access to the 
strengths of individuals who otherwise might have been excluded from or 
would be hesitant to seek a range of productive opportunities.230  
 224. Feingold, supra note 136, at 304 (reporting that “[s]elf-ratings of physical attractiveness” 
have been “correlated with affective, cognitive, and social measures”).  
 225. Feingold’s meta-analysis of studies on the physical attractiveness stereotype and 
characteristics actually associated with physical attractiveness revealed that “[s]elf-rated physical 
attractiveness was positively and appreciably related” to traits including “extraversion, mental health, 
self-esteem, social comfort, popularity with the opposite sex, and sexual experience.” Id. at 333. 
 226. Identity and body are intimately linked for women. See GIMLIN, supra note 167, at 4. 
 227. See id. at 75 (listing costs and recent proliferation of plastic surgery procedures); Adamitis, 
supra note 25, at 215 (describing how looks-based employment discrimination places particular 
pressure on women to control their weight and take various steps to enhance their beauty). 
 228. American media and culture exalt an ideal of beauty that most women cannot attain. GIMLIN, 
supra note 167, at 5. At the same time, “deficiencies” in a woman’s looks may be seen as “evidence of 
moral weakness.” Retail marketing efforts that invoke the unattainable ideal reinforce the perceived 
unworthiness of the average woman. A prohibition on looks-based discrimination in employment 
could make retailers a mechanism in the social transformation of that beauty ideal. See supra Part II.A. 
By displaying a broader range of looks, a retailer presumably could reduce the power of that ideal. 
 229. Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 31, at 84. Indeed, A&F’s looks-based policies may 
be backfiring in terms of profits. When A&F sales declined in 2003, some in the industry attributed the 
decline to its self-presentation “as an elite brand that attracts the beautiful people, not a label that looks 
for the masses.” Edwards, supra note 17, at 14. CEO Jeffries reportedly characterizes A&F as an 
“aspirational brand” that does not “want to be on every street corner.” Id. 
 230. Many Americans value pluralism, which makes the society “richer in breadth and diversity—
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C. The Mechanics of Extending Existing Antidiscrimination Law to 
Protect Looks 
Proponents of a prohibition on looks-based discrimination 
appropriately argue for an expansion of existing law, rather than the 
creation of a new legally protected category for the “unattractive.” A trait-
based or categorical approach would be insufficient and burdensome 
because trait categories are difficult to define, posing problems of both 
under and over inclusiveness.231 The most feasible avenue for such a 
prohibition is disability-based antidiscrimination law, which targets 
employer misconceptions about an individual’s ability to perform job 
duties without requiring the individual to fit into a strictly defined category 
of protection.232 Because employers’ lookist motives are often blatantly 
apparent in their practices and policies,233 looks-based discrimination 
claims might present even fewer proof challenges than other 
discrimination claims. 
Antidiscrimination law always involves tension between employers’ 
freedom to create a certain image and employees’ freedom to pursue a 
range of career opportunities. An effective antidiscrimination provision 
should further employees’ interests without being overly burdensome to 
employers.234 For these reasons, a prohibition on looks-based 
discrimination should apply only to immutable or semi-immutable 
physical traits.235 At the same time, individuals should not be required to 
take drastic measures236 to change their natural features or traits.237 A 
a society built upon the contributions and assets of the many rather than the few.” Cutler, supra note 
126, at 1178. 
 231. See supra note 186. 
 232. See supra Part II.B.4. The particulars of how and under what circumstances existing 
disability or handicap antidiscrimination statutes could be adapted to include looks as a perceived 
disability are beyond the scope of this Note, but one alternative is detailed in Note, Facial 
Discrimination, supra note 24, at 2043–48, which this Note endorses.  
 233. See, e.g., supra note 5 (describing articulation of A&F’s Look Policy in employee 
handbook).  
 234. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 34, at 31 (responding to the theory that antidiscrimination law 
intolerably imposes on individual freedom by “interfer[ing] with people’s private desires”). 
 235. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (explaining the role of immutability in justifying 
protection for an attribute and highlighting the unfairness of stigmatizing an individual on the basis of 
a trait that the person cannot control or that is crucial to his or her identity). An alternative that values 
employed autonomy more than employer choice would protect even mutable aspects of personal 
appearance. See Post, supra note 35, at 6. 
 236. Perhaps the most drastic is cosmetic surgery, which poses health risks. Color contacts and 
hair dye are available to change the otherwise immutable traits of hair and eye color and pose minimal 
health risks. 
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BFOQ allowance should exist for narrow situations238 in which looks have 
direct bearing on ability to accomplish core job duties.239 Overall, 
however, if the law is to accomplish socially transformative goals, the 
antidiscrimination principle refusing to recognize customer preference or 
economic interest as a justification for discrimination should extend to 
looks-based discrimination.240  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Gonzalez complaint, as well as interviews with former A&F sales 
associates and managers, reported a frequent practice in A&F stores when 
unattractive individuals inquired about employment.241 Managers 
commonly either told such applicants that the store was not hiring or 
accepted their applications but threw them in the trash when the 
individuals left the store.242 That looks were the key selection criteria, and 
that the applicant fell short, were never mentioned.243 Some A&F 
employees themselves felt the same unease as the company’s critics with 
its Look Policy and, more deeply, the pervasive social lookism that made 
that policy an effective marketing tool. 
That unease has proven insufficient to justify a prohibition on looks-
based discrimination, given the highly valued functions looks-based 
judgments serve in our society. The Gonzalez lawsuit, however, features 
an idea that previous cases suggested more subtly: the lookism we tolerate 
and the discrimination we condemn are connected. The costs of lookism 
should be reassessed in light of the probability that looks-based 
considerations are an important underlying motive for many instances of 
illegal discrimination. These costs always included faulty decision-
 237. Allowing employers to avoid a looks discrimination charge by hiring dark hair and dark eyed 
individuals but requiring color contacts or hair dye as part of its appearance policy would subvert the 
antidiscrimination goal of increasing diversity in public contact positions. 
 238. For example, looks would be a legitimate employee-selection criterion for modeling 
positions. In contrast, though serving as a “walking billboard” may be one component of a retail sales 
position (supra note 26), a BFOQ defense to looks-based discrimination would be unavailable to 
employers filling such positions because the key duties involve providing information to customers, 
completing sales transactions, and maintaining inventory and store display. See supra note 58. 
 239. Looks-based antidiscrimination law could borrow the narrow BFOQ defense developed 
through sex discrimination litigation. See supra notes 69, 79, 88 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 241. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 5; Interview by Morley Safer with Andrea Mandrick, 
former A&F store manager, 60 Minutes (Dec. 7, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/24/ 
60minutes/main657604.shtml (stating that applications were sorted into “yes” and “no” piles “based 
on looks”). See also supra note 23. 
 242. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 5. 
 243. Id. ¶¶ 3, 10. 
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making, unfair outcomes, and diminished productivity for “unattractive” 
individuals. If looks-based discrimination also facilitates discrimination 
against categories we are committed to protecting, lookism appears too 
expensive to tolerate anymore. 
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